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HU 520: Rondald Deibert Part II

Ch. 5: The Emergence of the Hypermedia Environment

Purpose of Chapter:

To map out the emergence of the hypermedia environment (in particular its sociological and technological roots) (114)

To describe the "nature" of the hypermedia environment (114)

Deibert’s GAP:

Most observers concentrate on distinct components of the hypermedia environment rather than the environment itself (i.e. the interactions and confluence of all components) (114) – rejecting this atomistic view, Deibert wants to take a more holistic perspective, which is based on his assertion that the hypermedia environment reflects an unprecedented complex "melding and converging" of distinct technologies into one single integrated web of digital-electronic telecommunications (114).

Technological and Sociological Roots/history

Cultural/Social consequences

19^th century communications technology developments are a response to "control crises" arising out of the Industrial Revolution that created ever more complex systems of production, distribution, and consumption of goods (116). The invention of telegraphy and photography (1830s), rotary power printing (1840s), the typewriter (1860s), the transatlantic cable (1866), the telephone (1876), motion pictures (1894), wireless telegraphy (1895), electric tape recording (1899), radio (1906), and television (1923) responded to that need.** – during the 19^th century, communications technology developments are mainly fueled by industrial (commercial/capital) needs/interests
With the advent of WW II and the ensuing Cold War, the dominant social force behind communications technology development shifts from commercial interests to "a complex of capital-government-military-science interests (119; 121).
After the end of the Cold War, commercial interests once again begin to take precedence over military interests in communications. It is out of this confluence of technological innovations (developed during and after WWII), military restructuring, and commercial marketing, that the hypermedia environment explodes in the late 1980s/early 1990s (119)
(leading to and caused by liberalization of government regulations and the cooperation between previously self-contained communications industries) (128)

The sweep of 19^th-century communications innovations in such a short period of time (basically, one lifetime) had a big influence on culture ** (avant-garde counter-cultural movements; creation of mass audiences; government-regulated monopolized television and radio stations (single point/mass broadcast paradigm)
20^th century/contemporary consequences discussed in chapters 6 + 7

Claims/hypotheses about the hypermedia environment and the transition we’re currently witnessing

hypermedia grew out of earlier (19^th century) technological, social, and cultural developments rather than just popping up out of nowhere
its emergence was facilitated through developments in the areas of digitization,** computerization** (microprocessor, 1969), and transmission technologies (development and improvements of fiber optic cables; microwave towers; satellites) (124-127). The confluence of developments in these three areas, together with the re-commercialization of communications technology after the end of the Cold War, led to the creation of a global, seamless Web
unlike earlier transformations, the current transformation of communication is not characterized by one single technological innovation or instrument of technology. Instead, we’re witnessing a convergence and melting of many distinct technologies** into one seamless web of electronic-telecommunications)– what’s new and unique here is the convergence of discrete technologies
unlike earlier communications environments, the hypermedia environment is ubiquitous and massively penetrates all aspects of life (114-15)

Defining characteristics of the hypermedia environment

its distinguishing features are speed and interoperability (115)

It is a global, seamless web of digital electronic telecommunications (due to increasing liberalization of govt. regulation and increasing cooperation/"tangled cross-border alliances" of formerly self-contained communications industries) (128; 130)

It is defined by a "complex, digitally integrated web of communications as a whole" rather than by a single instrument of technology or means of communication (131)

Interesting Observations + Lines of Thought to follow up on:

p. 129 "Debates have been fierce in both the developed and the developing world [what are the differences and similarities between these debates???] regarding the appropriate regulatory framework to facilitate the technological convergence [creation of a seamless integrated planetary web] favored by large private capital interests while still ensuring ‘universal access’ and ‘affordability’ for the average consumer. To date, the forces of ‘liberalization’ have clearly gained the momentum, having the support of both big business and large governments—in particular, the United States. It is from these forces that much of the constructed anxieties of ‘being left behind’ about hypermedia emanate."

Ch. 6: Hypermedia and the Modern to Postmodern World Order Transformation: Distributional Changes [Or: Who stands to lose and who to win in the brave new hypermediated world?]

Purpose of Chapter:

To examine and forecast the distributional changes **caused by the emerging hypermedia environment (137). Deibert’s forecast is based on the assumption that there is a correlation between a given communications environment and certain social forces. Different communication environments do favor different social forces (137). In this chapter, Deibert sets out to identify the forces that "fit" the hypermedia environment and hence are likely to thrive, and those that do not fit and hence are likely to whither/be weakened (137).

To identify those social forces whose interests or "logics of organization" appear to fit the hypermedia environment and those that do not (137)

Deibert’s GAP: (same as in ch. 5; no new gap pointed out)

Developments and Actual Consquences

Ideological Consequences on World Order

formation and expansion complex transnational production arrangements and global financial markets (174)– leads to the redistribution of political authority from individual states to transnational corporations (174)
rise of global (cross-national) civil society networks**, which influence politics and values interstitially** (i.e. through the margins and on the borders) (174)– constitutes a challenge to traditional forms of political authority which are bypassed by these movements that try to motivate populations directly (without the help of established political structures) (174)
Explosion and expansion of global surveillance properties [transparent planet]– will undermine/render difficult real-state security arrangements and favor negarchical (liberal-republican) state-security arrangements**

Defamiliarization of and challenge to the ideological assumptions about the nature of economic, social, and political organization underlying the modern world order paradigm.
Emergence of multiple and overlapping layers of political authority (175)
Transformation of the purpose and forms of states themselves (175) (shift from "container" to "transmission-belt"
Rise of negarchical state-security arrangements; major disadvantages for real state security arrangements [the new default from of statehood will be negarchical states]

Interesting Observations + Lines of Thought to follow up on:

Deibert emphasizes that the state will not "whither" away but will be transform from "container" to "transmission-belt" organizations designed to facilitate flows of information and capital, transnational social movements, and multiple overlapping layers of authority" (175). At the same time, he asserts that there is enough cultural and historical diversity among states to ensure a variety of separate trajectories within this process. Do we buy that argument. Can and will there be culturally different transmission belts? Or will they ultimately be all very similar because they are all shaped by the same/similar hard and software and use the same (or at least compatible) technologies? If we were trying to look at culturally specific transformations/reactions to communications technologies, where would/could we begin to look?

Deibert uses mechanic metaphors to talk about states/security arrangements (container, transmission belt) (175) and talks about the "architecture of political authority" (176), which is surprising given his use of an evolutionary (Darwinian) paradigm. What do these metaphors tell us about Deibert’s view of the state? What other (biological/organic) metaphors could he have chosen to reconceive the state?

Ch. 7: Hypermedia and the Modern to Postmodern World Order Transformation: Changes to Social Epistemology

Purpose of Chapter:

To examine/forecast the changes in social epistemology** that are likely to happen as a consequence of the change from communication to hypermedia (177; 201).

Thesis: The symbolic forms, cognitive biases and social constructs loosely associated with… postmodernism will flourish in the hypermedia environment because there exists a "fitness" (affinity?) between this environment and postmodern social epistemology.

Deibert’s GAP:

Other critics (e.g. Frederic Jameson and David Harvey)**have also linked the rise of postmodernist thought and material/sociological factors and Deibert is not even the first scholar to link postmodernism with changes in communication technology.** Unlike these previous analyses, all of which saw the rise of postmodernism as an essentially monocausal event, Deibert’s approach assumes that postmodernist thought is overdetermined (i.e. caused by a multiplicity of factors, not one main cause) and that there is no direct causal relationship between hypermedia and postmodernist thinking.** Rather, Deibert argues that "postmodern social epistemology will flourish to the extent that it "fits" the properties of the new mode of communication" and that "it will find a more receptive audience among those acculturated into the hypermedia environment" (179).**

Deibert’s representation of Postmodernism	"Fits"/analogies between postmodernism and hypermedia environments
postmodernism loosely describes a series of significant cultural transformations that have taken place in Western societies since the end of WWII
the roots of postmodernism rise back to the late 19^th century (Nietsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Saussure)**
postmodernism entails the death of the author (one single fixed identity) and an end to the idea of individual autonomous self. The postmodern self is fragmented, multiple, and multiphrenic (populated by any different identities and without clearly defined identity) (186).	in a hypermedia environment it is difficult to assert a single authorial voice and copyright (users can copy and change the things I post on the web) our individual autonomy is undermined by the way in which hypermedia blur the distinction between the public and private sphere hypermedia (e.g. the web) encourage users to experiment with different identities immersion in a hypermedia environment does cause a postmodernist shift in human consciousness (as Gergen postulates) but hypermedia do offer a space where the postmodern idea of a "multiphrenic self" seems more plausible and hence will find a more receptive audience
postmodernism favors the spatial bias of collage, pastiche, non-linearity, discontinuity and juxtaposition (Foucault calls it "heterotopia" ) (188), the blurring of reality and irreality, and the embrace of plural worlds.	since hypermedia are interoperable i.e. all media become immediately translatable into one another, communications become increasingly pastiche-like/mosaic (188) hypertext, a feature of hypermedia, clearly favors postmodern notions of intertextuality and nonlinear cognitive orientation (189) video games and virtual reality do blur realities and create simulated alternative worlds [world creationism] (192-93)
postmodernism sees the world as irreducibly and irrevocably pluralistic …. with no horizontal or vertical order. [This fragmentation and pluralization is driven by a relativistic philosophical position on Truth] **	the postmodern imagined community is hyperpluralistic and fragmented, i.e. the modern mass community is replaced by a multiplicity of postmodern transnational "niche" communities (Lyotard– atomization) (195) or an "ecosystem of subcultures" (Howard Rheingold) who are not bound by traditional notions of territory or place as a prerequisite for membership (198) as a consequence of demassification, national broadcasting gives way to multi-perspectival narrow-casting (196) hypermedia also atomize the modern community by increasing the interactivity of the communication process (e.g. personalized newspapers) (197).
øAnd what about the global village? Does it not counteract the fragmentary postmodern forces of hypermedia?	No. It is true that hypermedia reinforce the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (Robertson) and are one of the prime contributors to a sense of global identity, BUT there are opposing visions of what that one global community should be like (a huge uniform market place or a spiritual interconnectedness), which reinforce the postmodern sense of the coexistence of many fragmentary worlds. [In the long term, though, the concept of one global community might challenge modern claims of sovereign jurisdiction and as a basis for a planetary polis (a world-state) (200).

Consequences of a deepening and expanding postmodern shift on the World Order of the 21^st century

demassification of imagined communities (in congruence with the postmodern notion of the decentered, multiphrenic self) (201)
enmeshment of sovereign states in multiple layers of authority (in accordance with the postmodern sense of juxtaposition and superimposition and nonlinear orderings of space, as, for example, Foucault’s "heterotopia") (201)
increasing virtual interaction between communities and corporations in the nonterritorial spaces of computer networks.**
replacement of territorially distinct, mutually exclusive, linear orderings of space toward nonlinear, multiperspectival overlapping layers of political authority (201).
dispersal of modern mass identities centered on the "nation" into multiple, nonterritorial "niche" communities and fragmented identities (201)

Interesting Observations + Lines of Thought to follow up on

What is Deibert’s view of history? For him, postmodernism begins with after WWII and has roots in the 19^th century. Anything before that time does not interest him much. His theory of history hence must be linear and see history -as-progress [the evolution metaphor does imply increasing complexity and quality]. How would his argument be changed if he used another view of history [e.g. cyclical; history as decline; history as basically unchanging?]

Deibert’s discussion of authorship, which closely resembles that of Landau and Bolter, i.e. has the same weaknesses (mainly, a limited and formalist understanding of French thought about the death of the author).

Deibert’s discussion of hypertext. As mentioned before his discussion of hypertext shares the same problems as those draws on (in particular that hypertexts are unstructured—What Deibert overlooks that the hard and software we use *does* structure cyberspace and the way in which we navigate and experience it). What do other people think about Deibert’s discussion of hypertext?

Deibert’s discussion of world creationism (187-88; 191-93). Some interesting comments on American popular culture here (cf. also p. 217). What I wonder, though, is if a cathedral or a theater play or an overwhelming religious ceremony is not world creationsim (i.e. blurs the boundaries of reality and irreality), too? And that these borderlands between irreality and reality have always existed—even in modernism. Also, if I let the Luddite in me speak, she would argue that the blurring of realities in hypermedia is a fake one in that it does not teach the human mind to become receptive to presence of the irreal/unreal/supernatural in the real but instead teaches the mind that everything can be make-belief.

Deibert’s remark on the scientific realist epistemology of many computer scientists (194). Unfortunately, that’s as close as he ever gets to talking about human agency. The point he makes, though, is really interesting. Hypermedia are designed by engineers with modernist mind sets, he says. Is that true? And what are/could be the implications of that fact?

Ch. 8: Conclusion

Purpose of Chapter:

To sketch out the consequences of the changes in social epistemology and distributional changes on our world (202-3) and to review and refute arguments against the line of thought joined by Deibert.

Thesis: Drawing an analogy between the spread of pint and the emergence of hypermedia, we can reasonably predict that postmodern social epistemology will deepen and expand in the hypermedia environment. **(These predictions are backed up by theorists looking at world-order transformation from other (not communication technology centered) angles (210-11)).**

Line of argument:

In the communications environment provided by print, the following notions could thrive:

individual subjectivity and autonomy

a cognitive bias towards visual, linear, and uniform representations of space

imagined communities based on shared "national" vernacular languages** (which formed the embryonic shell of the modern ideology of nationalism)

These notions are the bottom line of modernist epistemology. Modernist epistemology favored/contributed to the architecture of the modern world order, in which political authority is differentiated into territorially distinct, sovereign nation states.

In the communications environment provided by hypermedia, the following notions are likely to thrive:

decentered selves

pastiche-like, intertextual spatial biases

multiple realities and worlds

fragmented imagined communities

There is a fit between these notions and the hypermedia environment where information is dispersed quickly along computer networks, where privacy is rapidly dissolving, where disparate media meld together into a digital intertextual whole, where digital worlds and alternative realities are pervasive, and where narrowcasting and two-way communications are undermining mass "national" audiences and encouraging nonterritorial "niche" communities (205).

The shift toward a postmodern social epistemology might have the following impact on the character of political authority on a world level:

global market forces will gain momentum and power while political authority will become increasingly dispersed (206)– states will continue to enter into complex webs of institutional arrangements and regimes at the regional/local and the global level.– The concept of states/statehood will not disappear, but it will change in that its traditional core values (self-sufficiency, autonomy, survival) will be replaced by new values (accommodation of liberal-capital interests, integration of states with each other and with regional and international organizations)

states will find themselves more and more subjects tot he structural power of transnational corporate interests ("the private makers of global public policy," Timothy Sinclair), i.e. the traditional subordination of economics to politics will be/is being reversed (206)

transnational social movements will gain power and challenge the state’s sole policy making power. These movements will operate/are operating across borders and form a new level of governance (207)

The dispersing of political authority and the increasing power of transnational corporations will produce a much more complex web of governance structures both "above" and "below" the sovereign state (206), that is the modern world order (with distinct, autonomous, self-sufficient states) will change toward a more complex, interwoven, interdependent world order with multiple and overlapping layers of authority and governance [social movements like Green Peace; regional and international organizations; transnational corporations, etc.] (207).

The long-term effects of these changes of the architecture of political authority include:

cooperative, global monitoring of the planet to protect the global ecosystem and climate

the emergence of a global imagined community, which would coexist with other (fluid and overlapping) identities

a change in the pattern of political conflicts/wars: political conflicts/wars will increasingly happen within and across states rather than between states only and occur all over the planet, i.e. the traditional division between the "post-historical" "strong" states of the "tame" North [if it ever has existed!] and the zones of lawlessness and disorder in the historical "wild" South will become increasingly blurred. Also, the most important rivalries no longer will be between states per se but instead between global business civilization (capitalism?) and international advocacy groups.

a tug-of-war (or, bi-stable equilibrium) on two levels: One, between centripetal/unifying forces such as new virtual communities and global market and finance interests and centrifugal/fragmenting forces, e.g. the counter-hegemonic movements of global civil society; and the other between to rival hegemonic forces: that of global capitalism vs. that of counterhegemonic social (non-government and not-for-profit) movements fighting for global justice. [Deibert’s prediction about the outcome of these tugs-of-war are that the global capitalist system will retain the upper hand (209)]

Political-Science Arguments that could be/are brought against Deibert’s line of thought	Deibert’s refutation of these arguments
The very idea that we could be living through a fundamental transformation of world order is misguided from the start because there never has been a stable basepoint—a Westphalian system [of autonomous nation states]—form which a transformation could unfold. The principles of territoriality and autonomy have been violated throughout the history nation states . Consequently, the changes we’re seeing today are nothing new of extraordinary but simply business as usual [Stephen Krasner] (211).	It is true that violations of territoriality and sovereignty have happened ever since the institution of the Westphalian system, there is no period such as the present when so many violations occur simultaneously and at so many different levels from a variety of different directions. The cumulative impact of these violations suggest that we’re dealing with a fundamental challenge to the norm itself (rather than just yet another violation of the norm) [I’m omitting Deibert’s first argument here because it’s very specific to his discipline and as such of less interest for us] (212-13)
Your predictions must be wrong because the state still exists ( and has not been replaced by an alternative institution	I’m not talking about the state so much as about political authority. All I say is that political authority in the modern world order was centered in the hands of sovereign states and that now that authority is dispersing to multiple domains. I’m not saying that the state will disappear, but rather that the state may no longer be the [sole[ locus of political authority (213).
	These objections to my approach illustrate a crisis in political science, which begins to recognize the pervasiveness of its state-centric bias. A way to break this bias is to use the analogies between the Middle Ages and the present to defamiliarize/redescribe the way we’re thinking about the present (215)

Problems with/questions about Deibert in general:

Deibert’s evolutionary model: If I choose an evolutionary/Darwinistic terministic screen/model of conceptualizing a development, what are the things I am not seeing (given the nature of my model)? I’d argue, the evolutionary model (in particularly, since Deibert never fully works out how that model would work and since he mixes biological and technological metaphors) diverts attention from human agency and intention. While it seems plausible to me that technological innovations do have unanticipated consequences, I don’t think technological change is like a change in climate due to a meteorite hitting the earth. Technologies are *not* natural forces like a hurricane; they are made by us. If we emphasize the unintended or unforeseen consequences of technologies we are diverting attention from our responsibility to always consider the consequences on the live and dignity of creation/nature/human and non-human animals etc. when we talk about technology. In a way, one could argue that talking about unintended consequences creates the illusion we could talk and think about technology without considering its social implications (many of which we could anticipate if only we tried and invested as much money into it as we do in the development of new technologies).

Also, as Bill has pointed out, a focus on unintended consequences/side effect diverts might divert our attention from the intended consequences of new technologies. As I have mentioned before, a way to get around this dilemma is to compare intended and unintended consequences of new technologies [There is a hint of this approach in Deibert’s comments on the Catholic church’s initial embrace of print technology. I think it would be really interesting to take a closer look at the argument and strategies used by various groups in their attempts to cope with print technology. ]

Deibert’s rhetorical stance: he indicates well how and where he enters the conversation in his discipline and appeals to other thinkers/scholars to support his thinking; also, he is careful to reiterate that his theoretical lens (modified medium theory with an evolutionary touch) is but one of many possible lenses. I would argue that these moves weaken his ethos too much, i.e. as an author he does not convince me why his lens is any better than the lenses used by the scholars he appeals to (he does not convincingly fill the gaps he identifies and sets out to conquer). At the end of the book I wonder if he really has said something new, or if I might not have just as well read one of the people he cites. Especially in his conclusion, where Deibert states he really uses the analogies between the Middle Ages and the present as a way to defamiliarize current dominant political scientific thought (215) and to change thinking in his field I begin to wonder (as much as I like the term "therapeutic redescription"). And his lame conclusion that some things in the hypermediated future will be good and others will be bad make me wish he’d be a bit more visionary and courageous. But then, I’m not a political scientist…….

Deibert’s assumption that there are analogies between the emergence of print and the emergence of hypermedia: While this argument seems plausible to me and while it seems natural to look for comparable situations in the past when facing change, I wonder about the short-comings of this analogy approach. How legitimate is it to compare the late Middle Ages with the Present? [In our reading group, for example, we talked about the way in which some hypermedia discussions seem to idealize the Middle Ages. By now, most of us do know that the Middle Ages were not as dark as they have been made out to be, but they were not purely bright, either (think of the abuse of serfs in general and women in particular and the wars between groups trying to conquer more land. In my village, for example, people still today tell stories about "the Swedes" who descended upon and devastated the region in the 17^th century)]

Deibert’s use of metaphors:… would make an interesting paper topic. Not only does he seem to be mixing biological and technical metaphors, but at the end of the book uses an interesting print/nondigital writing metaphor. Deibert writes: ….while a state may still exist and perform crucial functions, it may not necessarily be the locus of political authority. A pen is vital to the signing of a law, but the political authority is wielded by the executive who dies the signing, not by the pen itself" (213). [Lots of possible interpretations possible here. One of them could be that Deibert’s mix of metaphors indicates that he has not fully thought through the evolutionary/Darwinistic part of his theory—perhaps because if he did he’d find it does not fit???]