Kuhn, Chapter 3

Two senses of “model” or “pattern” (p. 23):

1. an object to be replicated

2. an object for further articulation and specification—A paradigm is a “model” or “paradigm” in this sense.

At the beginning of a period of normal science, governed by a particular paradigm (p. 23)—

· The paradigm is limited in scope and precision.

· Although more successful than its competitors, the paradigm is not completely successful in solving problems.

According to Kuhn—

· “Mopping up operations” constitute normal science. (p. 24)

· “Mopping up operations” are the activities that “engage most scientists throughout their careers.” (p. 24)

According to Kuhn, normal science “seems an attempt to force nature into the preformed and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm supplies”: (pp. 24-25)

· Normal science is not particularly interested in, and is often hostile to, new sorts of phenomena (not “displayed” as important by the paradigm).

· Scientists do not normally aim to invent new theories and are often intolerant of theories invented by others.

· A paradigm focuses attention on a “small range of relatively esoteric problems,” which might not even be recognized as problems if not for the paradigm.

Types of facts that scientists gather in performing “mopping-up operations” (pp. 25-27):

1. facts that the paradigm implies to be particularly revealing of the nature of things (p. 25)

2. facts that can be compared directly with predictions from the paradigm theory (p. 26)

3. empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory

o the determination of physical constants (p. 27)

o the determination of quantitative laws (p. 28)

o resolutions of ambiguities in applying the theory to new phenomena (p. 29)

Types of theoretical problems of normal science—

1. Using existing theory to predict factual information of intrinsic interest (p. 30)

2. manipulations of theory undertaken to compare the paradigm theory’s predictions against facts (pp. 30-33)

3. clarification of the paradigm through reformulation (pp. 33-34)

Kuhn, Chapter 4

Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving

Puzzles: essential characteristics—

1. assurance that a solution exists (p. 37)

2. rules that limit the nature of acceptable solutions and the steps by which they are obtained (p. 38)

Normal science research as puzzle-solving—

· The range of acceptable solutions to the research problems of normal science is narrow. (p. 35)

· The failure to solve a research problem is a failure on the part of the scientist and reflects on his/her skill and ingenuity. (pp. 35-36)

· The solution to the research problem is not necessarily intrinsically interesting or important. (pp. 36-37)

According to Kuhn, the paradigm associated with a normal science tradition recognizes as legitimate scientific problems only those that—

· are assured to have solutions (p. 37)

· can be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools supplied by the paradigm (p. 37)

According to Kuhn, scientists are motivated to try to solve the problems (puzzles) of normal science by—

· “the challenge of the puzzle” (p. 36)

· “the conviction that, if only he is skilful enough, he will succeed in solving a puzzle that no one before has solved or solved so well.” (p. 38)

According to Kuhn, normal science restricts acceptable solutions to research problems in the following respects:

1. The operations of measuring instruments/apparatus must be explained in terms of established theory. (p. 39)

2. Observations must be explained in terms of established theory. (pp. 39-40)

Types of rules that restrict acceptable solutions to the research problems of normal science, according to Kuhn:

1. explicit statements of/about scientific laws, concepts, and theories (p. 40)

2. commitments to preferred instrumentation and its legitimate use (pp. 40-41)

3. “quasi-metaphysical” and methodological commitments to fundamental sorts of entities [e.g., corpuscles] and acceptable forms of explanation [e.g., laws that describe corpuscular motion and interaction] (pp. 41-42)

4. commitments to “understand the world and to extend the precision and scope with which it has been ordered” (p. 42)

Important caveat (according to Kuhn)—

The ways in which paradigms guide normal science research

cannot always be reduced to rules. (p. 42)